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A major study recently  published by  the National  Academy of
Sciences,  prepared  by specialists  in world agriculture,  food and  nu-
trition,  reached  the  conclusion  that  the world's  food  system  is  not
working satisfactorily for either poor or rich  nations.  At the cen-
ter of the problem are an increasing  number of countries  - espec-
ially the "poorest  of the poor" - with malnourished  people.  Added
to hunger are other problems of spreading  seriousness, particularly
badly  organized  and  unstable  market  conditions.  Recent  develop-
ments in world agriculture  and energy have transformed  the struc-
ture  of  world  trade  and payments.  The  key  developed  countries,
United  States,  Germany  and  Japan  adjusted  comparatively  well;  a
considerable  number of the higher-income  developing countries far-
ed even better.  But the countries  of South Asia and Central Africa
have continued  to suffer seriously.  Their extremely  low growth of
agricultural output has been  matched by the high  growth  of popu-
lation.  Their frustration,  nationalism and intolerance  have become
intensified.  The extremely diverse  conditions among both develop-
ed and  developing  countries,  as  well  as the  virtual  nonexistence  of
structural forces  making for sustained  improvement,  give  credence
to the  view that further failures  in economic  policy  may engender
the spread  - internationally - of civil  warfare.
In an  article  on  "Lessons  of  the  Oil  Crisis,"  written  only six
months ago,  I reached  this conclusion:
The  most  serious  effects  of  the  higher  oil  prices  have  been
neither the  direct  real  costs  of  adjustment  within  the  OECD
countries  nor the transfer of resources  to the OPEC members.
They have been the hazardous uncertainty and the reduction of
the  credibility  of  demand-management  policy,  the  success  of
which  is essential  to  economic  stimulus  with  reduced  rates  of
inflation  for  the  entire  network  of  developed  and  developing
market  economies.  Recent  history  has  demonstrated  that  a
successful  demand-management  strategy,  as  well  as an energy
strategy,  is  contingent  on  the  recognition  that  price-level  ex-
pectations  and,  consequently,  future  prices,  are critically  con-
ditioned by the policy targets set by governments.
72,t  ill.advised  economic  policies  have  brought  the  recovery  from
the 1973-75 recession  to an extremely low growth rate in the United
States,  Germany  and  Japan.  There  are times  in history when  eco-
nmics  can  adapt  more  effectively  to a higher,  rather  than  lower,
nrte  of growth  in  effective  demand.  With  inflationary  pressures
subdued,  world  agricultural  output at  high  levels,  excess  plant ca-
,acitv  substantial,  and unemployment  rates still  inordinately  high
this appears  to be an appropriate time for more confident stimu-
lus  of the  market  developed  economies.  The  core  of  the  problem
centers  in  how  to  achieve  it without  reinforcing  inflationary  pres-
sures.
Insuring World Food and Agriculture
Complexities  inherent  in  current  world  agricultural  and  food
problems  are  immense  for  both  the market  and  centrally  planned
economies,  for  the  developed  and  developing  nations.  In  effect,
grinding poverty  in numerous  underdeveloped  countries  is now the
most pressing  problem  of  development.  According  to World  Bank
estimates, about one billion people  are living in poverty,  and growth
rates  in the poorest  developing countries  are insufficient  to make  a
dent in alleviating,  much  less eradicating,  destitution.
From  1950 to  1977, world population  grew from approximately
2.5 billion to more than 4 billion, with 80 per cent of the increase oc-
curring in the developing  countries.  If the current rate of growth
of roughly  2 per cent per year continues, there  will be at least 6 bil-
lion people  in the world by the year 2000, and 90  per cent of the ad-
ditional number will be in the developing countries.  As it is, no less
than  750 million  people now subsist on  an income  of less than  $75
per year.  More than half a billion  people suffer from malnutrition,
and  15  million  die from  it each  year.  Even the middle-income  na-
tions,  with  GNP per capita in  1972  of US$201-$375,  are estimated
to have  170  million  people living in  extreme poverty,  and hundreds
of  millions  subsisting  at incomes  of less  than one-third  of the na-
tional average.  It  has often  been  assumed - too  generally - that
the quantum jump in oil prices has further deteriorated the relative
economic  condition  of  the  LDCs.  Understandably,  the  increased
contraints on the world economy,  including the problems of the en-
vironment,  unemployment  and  urbanization,  have  intensified  the
concern  over  the  mounting  danger  not  only  of  large-scale  famine
and starvation  in the LDCs, but also over their attendant effects on
the nonmilitary  aspects of national  security of the developed  coun-
tries.  There  is  need  to  regard  these issues  in  terms of historical
balance  and  economic  proportion.
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ent  record  of  economic  progress  during  the  past  quarter-century
among the main developing areas of the world.  During this period,
average real income per person in the developing countries  rose sub.
stantially:  about 110 per cent, but from a 1950 level of only $170 at
1973  prices.  Their total food  production  rose  about  130  per  cent,
but per capita production  only 25  per cent.  Even the food produc.
tion of the poorest  LDCs expanded  approximately  100  per cent du-
ring  this  period,  but their  per capita  production  rose  only  15  per
cent from an abysmally low level.  Food production of the developed
countries  rose 90 per cent, while the per capita production  expanded
40 per cent.  The LDCs as a group had made considerable progress
in  raising  total  food  production,  but  the  predominant  volume  of
this advance  was absorbed by increased numbers.
The  important differences  in this regard between  the develop-
ed  and developing  countries,  as well  as among the diffferent  areas
in each group, are presented for the more recent periods  1961-1970,
and  1970-76,  in Tables  1 and  2.  During both periods,  the  average
annual  rate  of growth  of total food  production  was  more  rapid  in
the developing than in the developed countries.  However,  since pop-
ulation  in the developing countries  rose at a much more  rapid rate,
their  rate  of  growth  per  capita  food  production  was  strikingly
smaller.  For the  developed  economies,  whose  population  grew  at
approximately  1.0 per cent per year during the period  1961-70,  the
per capita food production rose at 1.6 per cent per year; whereas  in
the developing countries  where population  grew 2.3-2.5 per cent per
year, per capita food  production rose at most 0.6 per cent per year.
During 1970-76,  population growth rates in the developed countries
declined  to about 0.7  per cent, and their per capita food production
therefore  continued  to  grow at about  1.6 per cent per year despite
the decline  in the rate of growth  of their food production from 2.6
to  2.3  per  cent  per  year.  In  the  developing  countries,  however,
where  the rapid  rate of population growth has apparently begun to
decline - primarily reflecting reduced birth rates in Asia, including
China - and may  now be approximately  2.3  per cent per year,  per
capita food  production rose  only 0.3 per cent per  year.  Neverthe-
less, it is noteworthy that the developing countries,  as a group, have
not been  experiencing  a decline  in  per capita  food  production,  or
consumption.  The contrary  erroneous  view  may have  emerged,  in
part, from the deleterious conditions which have prevailed  in Africa
and the Far East.  From 1970 to 1976, per capita food production in
Africa  south  of  the  Sahara  actually  declined;  it was  nearly stag-
nant  in the Far East and, because of drought,  also in Latin Ameri-
ca.  Although  the  countries  of  Central  Africa,  in  particular,  have
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tion,  it must be underscored  that even  in Africa and the Far East
the  direct  cause  of  the  lack  of  improvement  has  been  associated
more  with  the  extremely  high  birth rates  than the  comparatively
low rates of  growth Of  total food  output.
Before  World  War II,  the  developing  countries  were  actually
exporters  of  grains - their  principal  foodstuff.  But,  after  World
War  II,  their expansion  in  income  and  numbers  brought about  an
increased  demand  relative  to  supply  of  agricultural  products,  and
this  resulted  in their  becoming  net importers  of  grains.  In total,
their economic  performance  was quite satisfactory before the quan-
tum jump in oil prices.  An examination of the record for the peri-
od  1961-73,  as presented  in Table  3,  shows that developing  market
economies  achieved annual  real rates of growth  in per capita  GNP
only somewhat  lower than those of the developed market economies,
3.7 per cent per annum as compared  with 4.0 per cent.  Again, with
the  exception  of  Africa  south  of the  Sahara  and  South  Asia,  the
other developing  market  areas  experienced  rates  of growth  in  in-
vestment,  manufacturing  and  agricultural  output  which  were  not
only higher than those in the developed market  economies,  but ex-
ceeded  them  sufficiently  relative  to their population  growth  rates
that the market economies of East Asia and the  Pacific, as well as
those  of  North  Africa  and  the  Middle  East,  experienced  growth
rates  per capita  GNP higher  than  those  of the  developed  market
economies.
Increasingly it has become less instructive to examine  develop-
ing countries,  in  the aggregate,  as  an economic category.  The dif-
ferences between developing  industrial countries,  OPEC, developing
nonfuel  mineral  or primarily  agricultural  countries,  and  underde-
veloped  "orphan-country"  cases are for many purposes of economic
analysis more  diverse than the differences,  say, between the devel-
oping industrial  countries  (e.g., Brazil or Korea)  and the compara-
tively  poor  European  "developed"  countries  (e.g.,  Spain  or Portu-
gal).  It is the low level  of per capita income,  practically always as-
sociated with backwardness  and extreme variability of agricultural
production,  attendant maldistribution  of income,  high levels of  ur-
ban  unemployment,  hunger  and  frustration-pervasive  not  only
in the most underdeveloped  countries but also in vast sectors  of the
middle-income  countries-  that cannot but continue to bring about
national strife and transnational conflict.  Yet the structure of per-
verse economic  incentives  in these very  countries,  and especially  in
Africa  south  of the Sahara  and South  Asia, provides  immense  op-
portunities  for  their  agricultural  transformations  and  industrial
advance.
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The  United  States  has  a strong  interest  in  improved  trading
arrangements  in food and agriculture  among  the noncommunist  as
well  as communist industrial and developing countries.  From 1971
to  1976,  United States agricultural exports  provided  approximately
22 per cent of total  U.S.  export earnings.  During that period,  the
U.S. exported about  60 per cent of its wheat output, over 50 per cent
of  soybean  production,  and  almost  20  per  cent  of its  corn  output.
The  export  coefficient  of U.S.  agriculture  (the proportion  of  agri-
cultural  exports  to agricultural  production)  rose substantially from
the  1960s  to the present.  For the long run, there appears  to be  a
large  and growing  market for U.S.  agricultural  exports,  especially
in  the  low  income  countries  that are  successful  in  achieving  rapid
development.  (See  Table  4.)  Not  surprisingly,  this  largely  de-
pends  on their  own agricultural  growth.  From  1967  to  1976,  U.S.
agricultural  exports  to  developing  countries  rose  approximately
400 per cent; the increase of U.S. agricultural  exports  to developed
countries  was  240 per cent.  Even  in absolute  terms,  in 1976,  U.S.
agricultural  exports to developing countries  were  11.2 billion;  they
were not much larger to the developed  countries - 13.6 billion. The
trend  strongly  suggests  a  complementarity  between  the  general
growth  of  agricultural  output  in the  developing  nations  and U.S.
agricultural  exports  to  them.  An  examination  of U.S. trade  with
66 countries  for the  period  1957-64  showed  that  as  per capita  in-
come  in these countries  rose  by 10  per cent,  U.S.  agricultural  ex-
ports to them increased by 25 per cent - an income elasticity of de-
mand for U.S.  agricultural  products  of  2.5.  Moreover,  a study of
nine  important  developing  countries,  with  a history  of  rapid  de-
velopment,  showed  that  they  expanded  their commercial  imports
of U.S.  farm products  from  $56  million  in  1955  to  $2.5  billion  in
1973.
Since  1971,  as the  U.S.  exchange  rate  was  adjusted  from its
overvalued  par  rate,  U.S.  agricultural  exports  revealed  a  strong
comparative  advantage  in world markets.  The net trade balance in
agricultural products rose from $1.9 billion in 1971 to $11.9  in 1976.
During the  same  period,  the trade deficit  in nonagricultural  prod-
ucts  increased  from  -$3.9  billion  to  -$21.1  billion.  Clearly,  the
strong U.S. competitive  position in food and agriculture in virtually
all markets - the traditional  ones in the European  Comumnity and
Japan, the developing countries of Asia, North  Africa and the Mid-
dle  East,  the  U.S.S.R.,  Eastern  Europe  and  China--has  much  to
gain  from  continued  growth  in  American  agricultural  efficiency
and  mutual  maintenance  of  more  liberal,  rather  than  restricted,
76trading  arrangements.  There  is  a  costly  disinterest,  the  world
over,  in moving toward  freer trade policies  in agriculture,  and even
some bigotry in criticisms of recent American  agricultural policies;
but  the ways  of  coping  with it  do  not include  matching it with an
opposite  bigotry.  The American  interest  in an expanding  agricul-
ture  is  bound to  play  a  decisive  role  in  immediate,  and long-term,
U.S. international  economic  policies: this legitimate  economic  inter-
est  can  be 'best served  through  incessant  efforts  at  national  and
multinational  removal  of  remedial  flaws  and  positive  government
policies  that  assist,  rather  than  impede,  the  attainment  of  long-
term agricultural  growth with a fair degree  of income  stability but
without  glaring  departure  from  perceived  equity  resulting  from
agricultural  "booms  and busts."
Changing  International Structure
Compared  with  the  1970s,  the  preceding  decade  appears  as  a
"golden economic  era" not only for the developed market  economies
but, with  the exception  of  South Asia  and  Africa,  for the  develop-
ing market economies  as well.  As  can be  seen from Table  4, in the
1960s,  real  GNP  in  the  industrial  countries  of  North  America,
Western  Europe,  Australasia  and Japan, which  formed  the OECD,
had  grown  at  5.3  per cent per  year;  the  GNP  deflator  indicating
price rises  rose at only 2.9 per cent per year; and the average rate
of  recorded  unemployment  was  2.8  per  cent.  GNP  per  capita
growth rates  averaged 4.1 per cent per year for the developed coun-
tries,  and 3.2  per cent per year for the developing  countries.  This
generally favorable  record  of  synchronized  growth  began to deteri-
orate before  the food  and  energy crises.  The aggregate  data,  fur-
thermore,  do  not  reveal  the  underlying  economic  forces  which
transformed  an  apparently  robust  economic  era  into  one  of  con-
straining  limits  and  decline  of  economic  growth  rates.
Deep-rooted  forces,  of course,  were responsible for the emerg-
ence  of certain  key distinguishing features  of  the  current  interna-
tional  economic  structure.  By  historical  standards,  comparatively
high GNP growth rates of the  developed market economies  during
the 1950s and  1960s brought  about even higher growth rates in the
value and volume of trade among them.  Measured  in terms of phys-
ical domestic production,  this in itself brought  about a greater eco-
nomic  interdependence  among  developed  nations  than  ever  before
in history.  In part, this process was stimulated by the creation of
the European Community,  the intra-member  trade of which grew at
more rapid rates than with the rest of the world.  To a large degree
the  key  members  of  the  European  Community  were  particularly
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them.  From approximately  the mid-1950s,  American  multinational
corporations  performed  this  fuction  by  direct  investments  in
Europe.  The  combination  of managerial  skill,  capital  and  knowl-
edge of mass market production and distribution techniques - built
up over generations - was thus transferred to Western Europe and,
mostly by adaptation,  to  Japan,  through  the intermediation  of the
multinational  corporation.  This trade, marked by large investment
in specialized  training of the human agent, by long-term  capitaliza-
tion of differentiated  oligopolistic  advantages,  and by the transfor-
mation of externalities  into internal  profits of the corporation,  was
basically  different  from--and  often  a  substitute  for-  trade  in
commodities.  The  tariff  structure  of  the  European  Community
against the outside  world accelerated  this development.  Measured
in terms of domestic or world GNP, the volume of U.S. foreign trade
plus  the  sales  abroad  of  its  multinational  corporations  brought
about a degree  of internationalization  among the developed  market
economies  unparalleled  by  any epoch in the annals  of economic  his-
tory.  But the  multinational  corporations,  the  expansion  of  which
appears  to  have  been  determined  substantially  by their  perceived
long-term earnings in respective areas, expanded  comparatively less
in  the  LDCs  and the  centrally  planned  economics.  Investment  by
multinationals  in  the  oil-exporting  countries  continued  to  grow
apace.  The LDCs continually pressed their claims for a substantial-
ly enlarged transfer of resources to them.  But in the 1960s foreign-
aid programs  met with  only  limited  success,  and the  governments
of the developed  countries kept their volume in strict control.  Nev-
ertheless,  the  granting  of  even  limited  aid  to  the  LDCs  brought
about strong pressures  for assistance  to the elderly,  disadvantaged
and  unemployed  within  the developed market economies.
These  trends gradually had an impact on the centrally planned
economies.  The Soviet Union,  in particular,  sought the technology
embodied  in  computer  and other  manufacturing fields - including
machinery  for consumer  goods - through trade  and  co-production
ventures  with  developed  market  economies.  Although  the  propor-
tion  of  foreign  trade  to  GNP  of  both  the  United  States  and  the
Soviet  Union  rose  from  1960  to  1973,  the  national  output of both
countries  as a  percentage  of world  GNP  declined.  Each  country's
exports as a percentage  of world trade also fell.  For these  and re-
lated  reasons,  their  degree  of  predominance  was  reduced  within
their  respective  spheres  of  influence.  As  a concommitant  of  this
phenomenon,  as  well  as  the  breakup  of Western  Europe  empires,
the foreign trade of most LDCs became less, rather than more,  con-
centrated;  it  was  thus  more  widely  dispersed,  with  the  related
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economies  and particular  groups of LDCs.
Regardless,  however,  of  the  long-term  mutuality  of  national
economic  interests among many Western countries and the centrally
planned  economies  toward  gradual  expansion  of trade  in such  key
fields as agriculture,  oil and gas, pipeline construction,  shipping and
other  forms  of  transport,  chemicals,  certain  minerals,  and  many
branches  of  machinery  and  consumer  durables,  between  1950  and
1970  the  dynamics  of  the  two  systems  impelled  a  politically  rival
relationship.  The United  States and the Soviet Union matched one
another in security expenditures:  between 1950 and  1970, the Unit-
ed  States  spent  $1.3  trillion  on  defense,  and  the Soviet Union  $1.4
trillion.
As  a result  of  these  forces,  Keynesian  economics,  viewed  as  a
long-term  deflationary  trend,  had obviously  been reversed.  Effec-
tive demand for consumption and investment, security expenditures,
budgetary  outlays  for  social  services,  medical  aid,  unemployment
coverage,  social  security--all  combined  to  render  economic  and
political  markets,  in  the  long pull,  sufficiently  strong that  by the
mid-1960s  effective demand  appeared to exceed supply at the going
price level.  Manifestly,  the Vietnam war intensified  these pressur-
es.  Accordingly,  before  the  food  and  energy  crises  of  the  early
1970s,  the  combination  of fundamental  historical  forces  combined
with  ill-advised  fiscal and monetary  policies  had brought  about ex-
pectations  of  long-term  inflation  in  the  developed  market  econo-
mies.
As  countervailing  forces  to  these  trends,  at  least  three  con-
flicting tendencies  must be noted.  (1)  Less developed nations which
considered themselves left in the backwash  of modern economic  ad-
vance had gained sovereignty over their commercial policies and had
developed  sufficient  administrative  competence  to  use  their  bar-
gaining  power  effectively  whenever  market conditions  would  per-
mit.  (2)  The conflict between  the economic  interests of the multi-
national corporations  and the problems  of extraterritoriality  of na-
tion states increasingly came to the forefront.  (3)  In the attempt to
prevent  a reduction  in  the  level  of  food  consumption  in  centrally
planned economies,  and to protect agricultural  interests in the Euro-
peah Community, world agricultural markets - and especially those
in grains - were fundamentally  split.
The consequence  of  these,  and  the  aforementioned,  forces  be-
came  acute  as the  result of the food  and energy crises  of  1973-74.
The  structure  of  the  world  economy  has  therefore  been  changed
for  an  extended  period  of  time.  This  change  has  been  greatly
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cannot be made solely by monetary and exchange rate policies, they
are  adjustments  which  can  be  tolerably  handled  by a program  of
policies  which  provide  satisfactory  macro  foundations  for  micro
economic  policies.
Policy  Alternatives: Macro  Foundations
for Essential  Micro  Economic  Incentives
By  intensifying inflationary  pressures,  the food  and  oil  crises
of  1972-73  critically reduced  the credibility  of OECD demand-man-
agement  policy.  After the  recession  of  1974-75,  fear of  renewed
inflationary  pressures,  in effect, brought about fiscal policies  in the
United States,  Germany  and Japan  that severely  dampened  the ec-
onomic  expansion.  Among  the key difficulties  was the  lack  of co-
ordination,  especially  in the United  States, between essential macro
and micro economic  policies.  Nominal profits obscured  the replace-
ment cost of capital.  Reduced real  profits, therefore,  in a situation
of substantial  excess plant  capacity,  hindered the rate of growth  of
new investment.  The evidence demonstrates  that, even under com-
paratively  low rates of capacity  utilization,  an expansion  in output
has  in  recent  years  triggered  rising  prices  with  about  a one-year
time lag.  This contemporary  phenomenon,  I submit,  is closely  re-
lated to  the fact that an  essential  stimulus  in effective  demand-
even with the existence of extremely high rates of unemployment-
cannot  now  be  met  by a  substantial  proportion  of  the  labor force
through  going wage incentives.  Confidence  in rapid  investment to
effectuate a successful  expansion  is wanting not only because of un-
certainty  in  government  policies  but  also  because  of  reduced  real
profits and  the inflation-induced  rise of minimum  wages relative to
the  productivity  of  insufficiently  trained  minority  groups.  For a
marked  rise  in  investment,  the economy  therefore  requires  a sub-
stantial  stimulus in effective demand;  but the micro wage-price  re-
lationships are  not conducive  for its achievement  without substan-
tial  price  increases.  Understandably,  under  such  conditions  the
pressures  for  increased  trade  restrictions  become  relentless;  the
pressures  for  restrictive  agricultural  policies  are  renewed;  the
harmonization  of international  economic  policies becomes  more  dif-
ficult;  and  the  constraining  limits enforced  on  the developed  mar-
ket economies  make  it increasingly  more  difficult  for them to pro-
vide the  minimum transfer of resources  to  the LDCs in a form re-
quired  to render  their economic  development  tolerably  secure.  In
briefest terms, the following policy recommendations  are presented
for consideration.
80suring  Food Supplies.
1.  the long term, food aid to the LDCs  does not provide a sat-
fatorv  basis  for  their  economic  development.  Fundamentally,
fa  must rely  on the establishment  of effective  economic  incentiv-
te  incre l ase their agricultural  and food production,  policies which
1 e  long  ^verdue  and  the successful  potentialities  of which  are  im-
To  provide  insurance  against.serious  short-falls  in  food
t enset. the United States  could-  at a moderate cost - furnish  the
ma lrket  developing  countries  with  food  assistance  approximating,
s naY  their annual  short-fall in output from long-term trend in excess
of 3 per cent.  Since world food output, in the aggregate,  is remark-
ably  stable,  this  form  of  insurance  against  natural  catastrophes
would  not  only  make  life  in  the  LDCs  much  more  secure  but  it
would  also provide  the  essential  underpinning  for their  own  more
vigorous  agricultural  and industrial  advance.
2.  U. S.  Agricultural Policy.
The progress  which the United States has made  towards an ec-
onomic  agricultural  policy,  especially  since the food  crisis  of  1972-
73,  is in jeopardy  as a result of near-record crops, and growing sur-
pluses not unrelated  to the lower rates  of growth in the world econ-
omy.  The sharp decline  in wheat and corn prices has brought about
the  establishment  of  "deficiency  payments"  plus  special  disaster
grants  to  American  farmers.  This  form  of  assistance,  when  re-
quired,  can  be  used  to  reduce  extreme  short-term  fluctuations  in
farm  income.  However,  the  establishment  of support  loan  levels,
which  also have  been  reintroduced  recently,  may once  again bring
about  large  government  carryovers,  impelling  subsidized  sales  in
world  markets.  The  need  for  adequate  reserves  is  incontro-verti-
ble.  But when  they are  the  result of  "price-supports,"  with  relat-
ed  crop restrictions,  they are  unlikely to serve  well the interests  of
United  States  domestic  and  international  agricultural  policy.
3.  Agricultural  Trade  With  the  CPEs.
The  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Grain  Supply  Agreement,  signed  October  1,
1975, appears to provide an improved basis for U.S. grain trade with
the Soviet Union.  Even before the agreement  came into effect, the
Soviet Union  imported  more  grain from the  United  States  in 1975
than it had done in the crisis period of 1972-73.  With the existence
of  adequate  U.S.  stocks,  these  grain  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union
were in every way an assitance to American agriculture.  Under the
agreement,  the  Soviet  Union  has  undertaken  for  the  five  years
1976-1980  to  purchase  annually  a minimum  of  six  million  tons  of
wheat  and  corn,  in approximately  equal amounts,  from  the United
81States.  If the  U.S. annual  grain  supply  were to  decline  below  225
million tons, the United States would not be obligated  to sell the six
million tons.  This  has  not happened  for the  past 15  years,  and is
unlikely  to  occur  in  the  foreseeable  future.  If  the  Soviet  Union
wishes  to purchase  in excess  of eight  million  tons,  government-to-
government  consultations  are required.  The signing  of  the agree-
ment indicates  that the governments  of  the  United  States  and the
Soviet  Union  both  recognized  the need  to  reduce  the  extreme  un-
certainties  and  fluctuations  which  prevailed  in  the  grain  trade.
Since  Stalin's  death,  the  Soviet  Union  has  undertaken  to  import
grains  whenever  required  to  insure  adequate  supplies  for human
consumption.  This  policy  was  extended  in  the  early  1970s  to  im-
port grain as needed  to support its program  of  expanding livestock
and milk production.  In time of an ever  moderate  world shortage
in  grains,  this  maintenance,  or  expansion,  of  grain  absorption  by
the Soviet Union,  as well as other centrally planned  economies,  and
the European community,  can - and has - exacerbated  the effects
of the shortage in freer world markets.  The provisions  of the U.S.-
U.S.S.R.  agreement  provide  the opportunity  for  a more  stable  and
expanded volume of grain trade between the two countries.
4.  Trade  with the  LDCs.
Projections  indicate that until  1985, or 1990,  annual grain con-
sumption will be rising at the most rapid rate in the developing mar-
ket  countries,  followed  by  the  developing  centrally  planned  econo-
mies,  and the  developed  countries.  But the  absolute projected  de-
mand shows  the largest expansion  in  the developing  market coun-
tries, followed  by the developed  economies,  and the developing cen-
trally planned countries.  This suggests that major emphasis should
be  devoted  to U.S.  agricultural  trade with  its  traditional  markets.
But the success of such a policy is contingent upon the expansion of
manufacturing  exports  by  the  developing  countries.  Their  syn-
chronized expansion with the developed market countries from 1960
to  1973  was  substantially  dependent  upon  this trend.  The manu-
factured exports of the developing countries  in 1960  comprised  14.1
per cent of their total exports; by  1973  it was  24.2 per cent and  in
1976,  approximately  30 per cent.  Even  in absolute  terms,  the ex-
pansion  has been substantial,  from $2.9  billion  in  1960 to $38.5  bil-
lion in 1974.  As a proportion of world manufacturing exports,  this
has been  a modest rise  from 5.1 per  cent in  1960  to 8.0 per cent  in
1974.  However,  with  the  contemporary  slower  growth  rates  of
GNP in the developed  market economies  and  the high  levels of  un-
employment,  relentless  pressures  have  been  growing  in  the
82developed  countries  to  impose  trade  restrictions  against  manufac-
turing imports  from the  LDCs.
5.  Real  and Imaginary  Constraints.
The  unparalleled  internationalization  of  the  developed  market
economies  in the 1950s and 1960s, with the extraordinary rise in the
growth rate of exports  by the developing market economies,  engen-
dered  potential  imbalances  in  the weaker  sectors  of the  developed
market  economies.  The  necessary  reduction  in  the  trend  growth
rate of real wages brought about by the rising oil prices was  an im-
portant  real  constraint  on  the  process  of  adjustment,  as  was the
higher real cost of investment to produce additional output.  These
forces could not but lead to increased pressures for protection.  Ris-
ing wages  in  leading  sectors  and rising  prices  intensified  political
demands  for wage increases  in the  weaker sectors.  Those  human
agents which could not stay abreast in relevant training became  un-
employed.  Given the rise in legal minimum wages, and other forms
of contractual  commitments,  a successful  stimulus for domestic and
international  economic  expansion  therefore  has  become  increasing-
ly contingent  on expanded investment in the human training of the
disadvantaged,  making  it possible  for them to render continual  ef-
fective  service at the going wage rate.
An enlarged  economic stimulus is the necessary requisite  as the
macro foundation for a substantial  degree  of micro  wage-price  ad-
justments.  But  expanded  investment  in  training,  both  in  public-
service  employment and via tax incentives  in the private  sector, is
now  indispensable for a sustained rate of expansion  with a marked
reduction in the unemployment level.  For a reduction in the spread
of trade restrictions  among the developed market economies,  a har-
monization  of  such  policies  appears  to  be  a  primary  requisite.
Recent evidence  has  shown that, for most developed  countries,  ex-
change  rate adjustments  are  a very  efficacious  way  of  achieving
required  adaptations  within  the  various  sectors  of  the  economies.
There  is  need  to reinforce  these adjustments,  under  the increased
surveillance of the IMF, by the harmonization  of investment policies
on the part of the United  States, Germany  and Japan.  If gradual
progress  could  be  made  in overcoming  the major real  constraints
that are  now impeding  international  economic  advance,  the  widely
believed  constraints  of historical  diminishing  returns,  insufficient
cultivable  land and  food  supplies,  exhaustible  energy  resources -
and  even the excessively  high birth rates in the LDCs - would,  in















































cfi c\i cei  C~





























































C9C  t  C)  m  00  Om tl-
C  O  d  <  f  _  . -4_ c
C  £  u)  O  oq  o
to  Cc  c  "o  ,-o
00  M  0  - C  -
c.  £  C>1  O  O  w-4
No  t'.0  c  Cfo  C9  O.0
Cl  'u;  1  c  1-  CIOC
o0 r  o  o  w  co oo
ci  ci  .t;  .;  I d
!
C0M  cM)0  00  00  CO
C  5  i  cli  o  6  ai'
O  CM  CCCM  o  CM  C  oL
o  t  ci  cJ  cn  0o cf
u5  c4  'S  cn  ci  cs c
0  oo  C  C  9  O  u  o1
CM  CoC  CM  CM
Ln  at  C3  IV  Li  cu



















































































opI  L -)  O
; %6  Cf 2
,..WI
r)  O)
i  Ce C-4 N%.0
0
3a  +}  '
teo
91§|  |
zs^  b
0  5^
4)
I
>.Q
3
uSf
1
*^
C1 0
8
I
6
-44
i2
*4 4
gCu
as
..  -
Ut  t
5
o
U  g;
3^
§A
86
C
c
C
C
r c
Q
7) 2
6 D
S
r)
i
*4
0
Li
Pr
Cd
I
I
I